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1. Introduction
One of the most robust ndings of the Industrial Organization is that, very often, market
equilibrium yields ine¢ cient allocations. But, how large are these ine¢ ciencies? This
topic has inspired considerable empirical literature, starting with the seminal paper
by Harberger (1954). In contrast, theoretical literature is scarce and focuses on the
case of homogeneous products. In this case, it is well known that the percentage of
welfare losses (PWL) in a Cournot Equilibrium when demand and costs are linear
and rms are identical is 1
(1+n)2
where n is the number of rms. McHardy (2000)
showed that when demand is quadratic, welfare losses can be 30% larger than in the
linear model. Anderson and Renault (2003) calculated PWL for a more general class
of demand functions. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) showed that if average costs are not
increasing and the inverse demand function is concave, PWL is less than 12n+1 . Finally,
Corchón (2008) o¤ered formulae for PWL under free entry and heterogeneous rms. He
showed that PWL can be very large even if price, marginal cost, output and number of
rms can be observed. The only paper dealing with heterogeneous products is by Cable
et al. (1994) and studies a linear duopoly model. They o¤er PWL formulae for several
solution concepts.
In this paper we analyze PWL in two models of imperfect competition with het-
erogeneous products and a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences: A
model with linear demand functions, Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984), and a model
with isoelastic demand functions, Spence (1976). Firms produce under constant average
costs. Our rst step is to nd PWL as a function of the fundamentals, i.e. parameters
in demand and cost functions. Generally, these parameters cannot be observed so our
second step is to obtain PWL as a function of observable variables like price, output,
number of rms, etc. When this is not possible, we will introduce items that might be
estimated, like the elasticity of demand. The goal of our analysis is to study the impact
of observable variables on PWL. Even though PWL can be calculated from data case
by case, our approach allows the theoretical factors explaining PWL to be pinpointed.
We rst consider the model with linear demand. Assume that rms and demand
functions are identical. We show that, given an observation of a price, output, marginal
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cost and number of rms, there are parameters of the demand function that convert
this observation in a Cournot or a Bertrand equilibrium such that PWL is arbitrary
(Propositions 1 and 2). This shows that PWL is unrelated to the di¤erences among
prot rates, contrary to Harbergers dictum: "The di¤erences among these prot rates,
as between industries, give a broad indication of the extent of resource malallocation"
(op. cit. p. 79). In our model all rms have the same rate of return on capital but
PWL can be very high, especially if goods are complements. It seems that Harbergers
procedure picks up welfare losses stemming from the failure of markets to equalize prot
rates and not welfare losses from oligopolistic misallocation, a related but di¤erent issue.
Next we show that if the elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL in a Cournot
equilibrium can be computed from observables (Proposition 3). The elasticity of demand
is of no help in the case of a Bertrand equilibrium because it can be obtained from
observables and the rst order condition of prot maximization. We show that if the
cross elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL can be computed from observations
(Proposition 5). Finally we study how PWL depends on these variables (Propositions
4 and 6). Some results are what we expected but others are not: when goods are
substitutes, PWL is decreasing on the price-marginal cost margins (often referred to as
the "monopoly index", Lerner, 1934) in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.1 And
PWL increases with the elasticity of demand in a Bertrand equilibrium. Why is this
so? Consider two markets, A and B, and let the price-marginal cost margin be larger in
A than in B. This means that the triangle that represents welfare losses is larger in A
than in B. However, realized welfare is also larger in A than in B because the demand
function in A is above the demand function in B. A priori, there is no good reason to
expect that one e¤ect is larger than the other. In fact, as we noticed before, when costs
and demand are linear and rms are identical, these two e¤ects cancel each other out
and PWL only depends on the number of rms.2 The same argument goes for demand
1This was noticed by Formby and Leyson (1982) in the case of monopoly.
2 In other words, price-marginal cost margins do not control for the size of demand. Thus, a high
margin might indicate either that demand is very large and rms are having a good timeeven if they are
very competitiveor that rms are "exploiting" consumers and destroying a large part of the surplus.
This is true even if actual production is known because it is a poor indicator of e¢ cient production.
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elasticity: a larger demand elasticity means less welfare losses and less realized welfare
so the total e¤ect is ambiguous.
Next we introduce heterogeneity in demand and costs. We provide generalizations
of our previous results on how to calculate PWL. Unfortunately, the resulting formu-
lae are pretty messy so we relegate them to an Appendix. We focus on the study of
the relationship between concentration and welfare losses. Some papers found that the
Hirschman-Herndahl (H) index of concentration is not a good measure of welfare losses:
in Daughety (1990) because more concentration may be associated with a larger output
in a leader-follower equilibrium; in Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Cable et al. (1994) and
Corchón (2008) because rms may be of di¤erent sizes.3 This contrast with the 1992
Merger Guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) where H is consid-
ered a reasonable measure of welfare losses, Coate (2005). We show that when it is
optimal to allow all rms to produce and goods are substitutes, PWL increases with H
in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria (Proposition 7). This case arises when goods
are poor substitutes. We also show that when it is optimal to allow only one rm to
produce, PWL decreases with H. This is what happened in the papers quoted above
where products are perfect substitutes. Thus concentration is bad (resp. good) for wel-
fare when goods are poor (resp. good) substitutes. This is because e¢ cient production
must balance cost savingswhich go in the direction of concentrating production in the
most e¢ cient rmswith consumer satisfaction where the latter may require consider-
able diversication of production. Where the last e¤ect is not very large (i.e. when
products are close substitutes) cost savings drives e¢ ciency and thus concentration
does not harm e¢ ciency. But when products are poor substitutes e¢ cient production
requires output dispersion and concentration is harmful. We also show that at the value
of H considered by the FTC as a threshold for a concentrated industry, PWL is large
in a Cournot equilibrium but may be small in a Bertrand equilibrium.
In Section 3 we assume that the representative consumer has preferences over dif-
ferentiated goods representable by a CES utility function. We also assume that there
is a large number of identical rms. This model (Spence, 1976) and its variants (see,
3The point that minor rms may be harmful for welfare was rst made by Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) are popular in the elds of monopolistic competition,
international trade, geography and economics, etc. But contrary to these models, we
assume that the number of rms is exogenous. The reason for this is that endogenizing
the number of rms needs xed costs and the latter may produce large PWL (Corchón,
2008). Since in this paper we want to focus on PWL produced by product heterogeneity
alone we assume that the number of rms is given. We show that PWL tends to zero
when demand elasticity tends to innity, but PWL tends to one when the degree of ho-
mogeneity of the CES function tends to one (Proposition 8). This qualies a conjecture
of Stigler (1949): "...the predictions of this standard model of imperfect competition
di¤er only in unimportant respects from those of the theory of competition because the
underlying conditions will usually be accompanied by very high demand elasticities for
the individual rms". In this model, a high elasticity of demand makes PWL small,
but given any elasticity of demand, we can obtain PWL as close to one as we wish.
Next, we show that PWL can be recovered from the observation of a price, an output,
a marginal cost and the number of rms (Proposition 9). However a low price-marginal
cost margin does not guarantee that PWL is small: even if price tends to the marginal
cost, when the number of rms is su¢ ciently large, PWL may exceed those in the linear
model under monopoly. Moreover, when the number of rms tends to innity, PWL is
decreasing in the price-marginal cost margin (Proposition 10). Again, this is another
case where price-marginal cost margins and welfare losses are not related in the way we
previously thought.
Summing up, we have three main conclusions. First, our main message is positive:
obtaining PWL from data is possible in two well-known models of imperfect competition.
Second, the impact of rates of returns, price-marginal cost margins or the elasticity
of demand on PWL, is not always what we thought to be. Finally, we provide an
explanation of the role of the H index on PWL.
2. The Linear Model
In this section we assume that inverse demand is linear. In the rst subsection we
assume that all rms are identical which allows for clean formulae of welfare losses. In
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the second subsection we study the case where costs and intercepts of inverse demands
are di¤erent among rms. The second part o¤ers formulae for PWL that are used to
discuss the role of concentration in oligopolistic markets.
2.1. The Symmetric Case
The market is composed of n rms. The output (resp. price) of rm i is denoted by
xi (resp. pi). Firms are identical with a cost function cxi. There is a representative
consumer with a quadratic utility function. The consumer surplus is
U = 
nX
i=1
xi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj  
nX
i=1
pixi:  > c;  > maxf0; ; (n  1)g:
Under these assumptions, U() is concave. FOC of utility maximization yield
pi =   xi   
X
j 6=i
xj ; i = 1; 2; :::; n. (2.1)
Goods are substitutes (resp. complements) i¤  > 0 (resp. < 0). The ratio  represents
the degree of product di¤erentiation: if  = 0 products are independent, and if  = 
they are perfect substitutes.
Denition 1. A linear market is a list f; ; ; c; ng with  > c,  > maxf0; ; (n 
1)g and n 2 N.
Social welfare is dened as
W = 
nX
i=1
xi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj   c
nX
i=1
xi: (2.2)
The social optimum is a list of outputs that maximize social welfare. It is easy to see
that optimal outputs are all identicaldenoted by xoiand equal to
xoi =
  c
 +  (n  1) : (2.3)
Social welfare in the optimum is
W o =
n (  c)2
2 ( + (n  1) ) : (2.4)
Now we are ready to dene our equilibrium concepts.
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Denition 2. A Cournot equilibrium in a linear market is a list of outputs (xc1; x
c
2; :::; x
c
n)
such that for each i, xci maximizes

  xi   
P
j 6=i x
c
j   c

xi.
From the FOC of prot maximization we obtain that
xci =
  c
2 +  (n  1) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2.5)
In order to dene a Bertrand equilibrium we need to invert the system (2.1). Adding
up these equations from 1 to n we get
Pn
i=1 pi = n  ( + (n  1))
Pn
i=1 xi, or
nX
i=1
xi =
n Pni=1 pi
 + (n  1) ;
which plugged into (2.1) yields
pi =   (   )xi   
nX
i=1
xi =   (   )xi   n 
Pn
i=1 pi
 + (n  1) , or
xi =
(   )  pi( + (n  2)) + 
P
j 6=i pj
(   )( + (n  1))  x
b
i(pi; p i), i = 1; 2; :::; n, (2.6)
where p i is a list of all prices minus pi. Notice that given our assumptions on  and
, @xi@pj < 0 i¤  < 0. Now we can dene a Bertrand equilibrium.
Denition 3. A Bertrand equilibrium in a linear market is a list of prices (pb1; p
b
2; :::; p
b
n)
such that for each i, pbi maximizes (pi   c)xbi(pi; pb i).
From the FOC of prot maximization we obtain that
pbi =
(   ) + c( + (n  2))
2 + (n  3) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2.7)
Let W c be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium. Let us dene the
percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium as
PWLc  W
o  W c
W o
: (2.8)
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Lemma 1. In a linear market the percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium
is
PWLc =
1
2 + (n  1) 
2 (2.9)
Proof: From (2.2), social welfare in a Cournot equilibrium can be written as W c =
nxci   2nxc2i   2n (n  1)xc2i   cnxci . Thus, from (2.5) we obtain that
W c =
n (  c)2 (3 + (n  1) )
2 (2 + (n  1) )2 :
Then,
PWLc = 1  W
c
W o
=
1
2 + (n  1) 
2 :
Notice that PWL is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation,  . Thus, minimal
PWL is 1
(n+1)2
and occurs for the maximal value of  ; which is one, i.e. when products
are perfect substitutes. When products are substitutes, maximal PWL occurs for the
minimal value of  which is zero, and PWL is :25: When products are complements,
maximal PWL = 1.4
Let PWLb be the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium. Then,
Lemma 2. In a linear market the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium
is
PWLb =
 
1  
2 + (n  3) 
!2
(2.10)
Proof: From (2.7) we obtain that all rms produce the same output, xbi , namely
xbi =
(  c) ( + (n  2) )
(2 + (n  3) ) ( + (n  1) ) :
Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium is W b = nxbi   2nxb2i   2n (n  1)xb2i   cnxbi ,
W b =
n (  c)2 (3 + (n  4) ) ( + (n  2) )
2 (2 + (n  3) )2 ( + (n  1) ) :
4When goods are complements, PWL increases with n. This is because there is insu¢ cient coordi-
nation among rms and the greater the number of rms, the greater the coordination problem.
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Thus,
PWLb = 1  W
b
W o
=
 
1  
2 + (n  3) 
!2
:
Note that PWL is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation  . Thus, minimal
PWL is zero and occurs when  = , i.e. when products are perfect substitutes. When
products are substitutes, maximal PWL occurs for  = 0, namely :25: When products
are complements, maximal PWL is

n
n+1
2
. Clearly, if n = 1, PWLj = 0:25, j = c; b,
so in the remainder of the section we will assume that n > 1.
We are interested in the PWL yielded by imperfectly competitive markets, condi-
tional on the values taken by certain variables that can be observed, namely market
prices, outputs, marginal cost and number of rms. We assume that marginal cost is
observable because under constant returns, the marginal cost equals the average variable
cost which, in principle, can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Formally:
Denition 4. An observation is a list fp; xi; c; ng where p is market price, xi is output
of rm i, c (< p) is the marginal cost and n is number of rms.
Let us relate PWL with observable variables. First we consider the Cournot equi-
librium.
Proposition 1. Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng and a number v 2 ( 1(n+1)2 ; 1) there
is a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (xi; xi; :::; xi) is a Cournot equilibrium for this
market, p =   xi   (n  1)xi and PWLc = v.
Proof : Let
 = c+
p  cp
v
;  =
p  c
xi
and  =
(p  c)  1  2pv
(n  1) xi
p
v
: (2.11)
Clearly,  > c and  > maxf0; ; (n   1)g since p > c, v > 1
(n+1)2
and v <1. We
easily see that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields an equilibrium where xci = xi,
i = 1; 2; :::; n, p =   xi   (n  1)xi and PWLc = v, so the proof is complete.
Now we turn to the case of the Bertrand equilibrium.
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Proposition 2. Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng and a number v 2

0;

n
n+1
2
there
is a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this
market, xi = xbi(p; p i) where p i is a list of n  1 identical p, and PWLb = v.
Proof : Let
 = c+
p  cp
v
;  =
p  c
xi
 p
v  1  1 +pv (n  3)
v+ n
 
v pv and  = c  pxi 1  3
p
v+ 2v
v+ n
 
v pv :
It is easy to check that 0 < c <  and  > maxf0; ; (n   1)g. The linear market
f; ; ; c; ng yields a Bertrand equilibrium where pbi = p and xbi = xi with PWLb = v,
that completes the proof.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that observable variables put very few restrictions on
PWL. In particular, neither price-marginal cost margins nor prot rates have any re-
lationship with PWL. Let us look for restrictions that can take a bite out of PWL.5
Suppose that the demand elasticity, denoted by ", is observable. From (2.6)
"   @xi
@pi
p
xi
=
 + (n  2)
(   )( + (n  1))
p
xi
: (2.12)
Let us introduce a new piece of notation, namely T  "p cp . Now we have the
following result.
Proposition 3. Given an observation fp; xi; c; n; "g such that T  "p cp  1 and the in-
formation that goods are substitutes or complements, there is a linear market f; ; ; c; ng
such that (xi; xi; :::; xi) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, p =  xi  (n  1) xi
and
PWLc =
1 
2 +
(T 1)(n 2)
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T
!2 (2.13)
with sign "+" (resp. sign "-") corresponding to the case of substitutes (resp. comple-
ments).
5 If goods are substitutes, the maximum PWL in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria occurs when
 ' 0, namely PWL ' :25, which corresponds to PWL under monopoly:
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Proof : Let us consider the case of substitutes rst. Let
 = c+
p
2"
 
T (n+ 2)  (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!
 =
p  c
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
p  c
xi
:
Clearly,  > 0. We need to show that 0 <  < 1 and  > c. Note that for T  1 the
square root is dened in real numbers and
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

 (T  1) (n  2)
because if not, we would have n2T < (n 2)2T, which is impossible. Then the condition
0 <  < 1 amounts to
0 <
(T  1) (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1) < 1 =) 4T (n  1)
2 > 0;
that always holds for T 2 [1;1). The condition  > c amounts to (T  1) (n   2) +r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

+ 4T > 0, that holds for T 2 [1;1). Now we need to prove
that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where xci = xi and
p =   xi    (n  1) xi. First,
xci =
  c
2 +  (n  1) =
p
2"

T (n+ 2)  (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2p cxi +
(T 1)(n 2)+
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T
p c
xi
= xi:
Then,
  xi    (n  1) xi = c+ p
2"
 
T (n+ 2)  (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!
 
xi
0BB@p  cxi +
(T  1) (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T
p  c
xi
1CCA = p:
11
So we have shown in the case of substitutes that there exists a linear market f; ; ; c; ng
that yields a Cournot equilibrium where xci = xi and p =   xi    (n  1) xi. Then it
is straightforward to nd PWLc by plugging the values of  and  in (2.9).
Now we consider the case of complements. Let
 = c+
p
2"
 
T (n+ 2)  (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!
 =
p  c
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
p  c
xi
:
We need to show that   1n 1 <  < 0 and  > c. The former condition amounts to
  1
n  1 <
(T  1) (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1) < 0 =) 4T > 0;
that holds for T 2 [1;1). The latter condition amounts to T (n+ 2)   (n  2)  r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

> 0) 4T (3 + T+ n (T  1)) > 0, that holds for T 2 [1;1).
Let us show now that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where
xci = xi and p =   xi    (n  1) xi:
xci =
  c
2 +  (n  1) =
p
2"

T (n+ 2)  (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2p cxi +
(T 1)(n 2) 
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T
p c
xi
= xi;
  xi    (n  1) xi = c+ p
2"
 
T (n+ 2)  (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!
 
xi
0BB@p  cxi +
(T  1) (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T
p  c
xi
1CCA = p:
So we have proved in the case of complements that there exists a linear market f; ; ; c; ng
that yields a Cournot equilibrium where xci = xi and p =   xi    (n  1) xi. Then it
is straightforward to nd PWLc by plugging the values of  and  in (2.9).
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According to Proposition 3 we can calculate PWL in a Cournot equilibrium in
(2.13) from three variablesthe number of rms, the elasticity of demand and the price-
marginal cost ratioplus the information that goods are complements or substitutes
which gives us the sign of  . Let us now study how PWL depends on n and T.
Proposition 4. When goods are substitutes (resp. complements), PWLc is decreasing
(resp. increasing) in n, the elasticity of demand and the price-marginal costs margins.
Proof : First, we consider the case of substitutes, that is  =
(T 1)(n 2)+
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T(n 1) :
@PWLc
@n
=  
8T2
 
T  1 + (2+n(T 1))(T 1)q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
!

2 + n (T  1) + 2T+
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
3 < 0;
so an increase in the number of rms decreases PWLc, which is what intuition suggests.
To continue, we compute
@




@T :
@




@T
=
n (4 + n (T  1)  2T)  2 (2  T) + (n  2)
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2 (n  1)T2
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

which is positive, so PWLc decreases with T when goods are substitutes.
Second, we study the case of complements, that is  =
(T 1)(n 2) 
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T(n 1) .
@PWLc
@n
=  
8T2
 
1  T+ (2+n(T 1))(T 1)q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
!

 2  n (T  1)  2T+
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
3 > 0:
Therefore, when goods are complements PWLc is increasing in the number of rms n.
Next, we calculate
@




@T which amounts to
@




@T
=
n ( 4  n (T  1) + 2T)  2 (T  2) + (n  2)
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2 (n  1)T2
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

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which is negative, so PWLc increases with T.
In Proposition 4 the sign of the e¤ect of the number of rms and demand elasticity
is what we expected: more competitioni.e. the higher n or "is good (resp. bad) when
goods are substitutes (complements). However the e¤ect of price-marginal cost margins
runs counter to our intuition. As we remarked in the introduction this is because this
margin a¤ects both welfare losses and realized welfare.
We now consider the Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, FOC condition of prot
maximization can be written as pi = "(pi   c). Thus the observation of " does not add
any new information once pi and c are observed. A way out of this problem is provided
if the cross elasticity of demand @xi@pj
pj
xi
, denoted by , is observable, as shown next.
Proposition 5. Given an observation fp; xi; c; n; g such that pp c > maxf(n 1); g,
there is a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for
this market, xi = xbi(p; p i) where p i is a list of n  1 identical p, and
PWLb =
 
p
p c   (n  1)
2 pp c   (n  1)
!2
: (2.14)
Proof : Let
 = p+
p
p
p c    (n  1)
 =
p

p
p c    (n  2)

xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)

 =
p
xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)
 :
It is easy to prove that  > c and  > max f0; ;  (n  1)g for pp c > maxf(n  
1); g. Let us show that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a Bertrand equilibrium
where pbi = p and x
b
i(p; p i) = xi:
pbi =
(   ) + c( + (n  2))
2 + (n  3) =
1
2
p

p
p c (n 2)

xi

p
p c+

p
p c (n 1)
 + p(n 3)
xi

p
p c+

p
p c (n 1)
 
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( 
p+
p
p
p c    (n  1)
!0@ p

p
p c    (n  2)

xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)
   p
xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)

1A+
c
0@ p

p
p c    (n  2)

xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)
 + p(n  2)
xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)

1A) = p;
xbi(p; p i) =
(   )  p( + (n  2)) +  (n  1) p
(   )( + (n  1)) =
  p
 +  (n  1) =
p
p
p c (n 1)
p

p
p c (n 2)

xi

p
p c+

p
p c (n 1)
 + p(n 1)
xi

p
p c+

p
p c (n 1)
 = xi:
Thus given an observation fp; xi; c; n; g such that pp c > maxf(n   1); g there is
a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this
market, xi = xbi(p; p i) where p i is a list of n  1 identical p. Then it is straightforward
to nd PWLb plugging the values of  and  in (2.10).
The formula (2.14) allows for the calculation of PWL in a Bertrand equilibrium
from just three magnitudes: the number of rms, the price-marginal cost margins (or,
alternatively, the elasticity of demand) and the cross elasticity of demand. Let us analyze
the impact of a change in observable variables on PWLb.
Proposition 6. When goods are substitutes (resp. complements) PWLb is decreasing
(resp. increasing) in the number of rms and price-marginal cost margins and it is
increasing (resp. decreasing) in the elasticity of demand. PWLb is decreasing in the
cross elasticity of demand.
Proof: From (2.14) we get
@PWLb
@n
=  2" ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 < 0,  > 0;
@PWLb
@"
=
2 (n  1)  ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 > 0,  > 0;
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@PWLb
@
=  2 (n  1) " ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 < 0:
From these formulae the proposition follows.
Proposition 6 conrms our intuitions about the role of the number of rms and
the cross elasticity of demand on welfare losses, namely that when goods are substitutes
(resp. complements) an increase in the number of rms decreases (resp. increases) PWL
and an increase in the cross elasticity of demand decreases PWL both for substitutes
and for complements. But, again, the impact of the price-marginal cost margin goes
contrary to what intuition suggests: It is negative (resp. positive) for substitutes (resp.
complements). It is also notable that demand elasticity a¤ects PWL in a counterintu-
itive way. Again we have to bear in mind that demand elasticity a¤ects both welfare
losses and realized welfare.
2.2. Heterogeneous Firms
We extend the model presented before to the case where rms are heterogeneous on
two counts. On the one hand marginal costs, denoted by ci for rm i, may be di¤erent
across rms. On the other hand the parameter , denoted by i for rm i, may be
di¤erent across rms.6 Assume i > ci for all i: The consumer surplus is now
U =
nX
i=1
ixi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj  
nX
i=1
pixi;  > maxf0; ; (n  1)g
The restrictions below guarantee that the outputs of all rms are positive in Cournot
and Bertrand equilibria.
2 +  (n  1) > 
Pn
i=1 (i   ci)
i   ci ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2.15)
( +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))
 +  (n  2) >

Pn
i=1 (i   ci)
i   ci i = 1; 2; :::; n: (2.16)
Under our assumptions, U() is concave. FOC of utility maximization yields
pi = i   xi   
X
j 6=i
xj ; i = 1; 2; :::; n.
6This model has been used, among others, by Häckner (2000) and Hsu and Wang (2005).
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Social welfare reads now
W =
nX
i=1
ixi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj  
nX
i=1
cixi: (2.17)
Evaluating social welfare in the optimum is not straightforward because it depends on
the number of active rms in the optimum. For the time being, let us assume that it is
optimal that m rms are active. Then optimal outputsdenoted by xoiare equal to
xoi =
i   ci
     

mX
i=1
(i   ci)
( +  (m  1))(   ) ; i = 1; 2; :::;m (2.18)
and aggregate output in the optimumdenoted by xois equal to
xo =
mX
i=1
xoi =
mX
i=1
(i   ci)
 +  (m  1) : (2.19)
We now nd the optimal number of rms m.
Algorithm to dene an optimal number of rms m. Let us rank rms accord-
ing to the value of i ci. Without loss of generality assume that v cv  v+1 cv+1,
v = 1; 2; :::; n   1. Clearly if rm v produces a positive output in the optimum, rms
v   1; v   2; etc. also produce a positive output in the optimum. Suppose that it is
optimal that rms 1 to k   1 produce a positive output. Now evaluate @W@xk in (2.17) at
xk = 0 and xj = xoj , j = 1; :::; k   1 according to (2.18), and we obtain that
@W
@xk
= k   ck   
k 1X
j=1
xoj : (2.20)
If @W@xk  0, clearly, xok = 0. If
@W
@xk
> 0, rm k must produce a positive output in the
optimum.
This algorithm needs knowledge of all the parameters dening a market. In an
Appendix we show that all these parameters can be recovered from market data and
demand elasticities in a way identical to what we did in Propositions 3 and 5. We
17
will focus on two particular cases. First, when (2   c2)  (1   c1), only rm
1 will produce a positive output in the optimum since from (2.18) and (2.20), @W@x2 =
2   c2    1 c1  0. Second, when
(n   cn)( +  (n  2)) > 
n 1X
i=1
(i   ci) ; (2.21)
the number of active rms is the same in the optimum and in an equilibrium, because
from (2.18) and (2.20), @W@xn = n   cn   
Pn 1
j=1 x
o
j > 0. Notice that when goods
are substitutes the conditions in (2.15) and (2.16) are implied by (2.21). If goods are
complements, (2.15) implies (2.16) and (2.21).
In this framework, a Cournot equilibrium is a list of outputs (xc1; x
c
2; :::; x
c
n) such
that for each i, xci maximizes

i   xi   
P
j 6=i x
c
j   ci

xi. From the FOC of prot
maximization we obtain that
xci =
i   ci
2     

2   
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
2 +  (n  1)
and aggregate output at the Cournot equilibrium reads
xc =
nX
i=1
xci =
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
2 +  (n  1) :
In order to compute a Bertrand equilibrium we rst write the demand for rm i:
xi =
i ( +  (n  2))  pi ( +  (n  2))  
P
j 6=i(j   pj)
(   ) ( +  (n  1))  x
b
i (pi; p i) :
A Bertrand equilibrium is a list (pb1; p
b
2; :::; p
b
n) such that for all i p
b
i maximizes
(pi   ci)xbi

pi; p
b
 i

:
Then,
xbi =
 +  (n  2)
(   ) (2 +  (2n  3))
 
i   ci     +  (n  2)
(2 +  (n  3)) ( +  (n  1))
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
!
;
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and aggregate output at the Bertrand equilibrium reads
xb =
 +  (n  2)
(2 +  (n  3)) ( +  (n  1))
nX
i=1
(i   ci) :
Next, we link PWL with the Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration. Let sji be the
market share of rm i in a Cournot equilibrium (j = c), a Bertrand equilibrium (j = b)
or in the optimum (j = o). We dene the Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration
in a Cournot equilibrium or a Bertrand equilibrium as Hj Pni=1(sji )2, j = c; b, and in
the optimum as Ho Pmi=1(soi )2 .
Lemma 3. When rms are heterogeneous, the percentage of welfare losses in a Cournot
equilibrium is
PWLc = 1 
0@ 1 +  (m  1)
m  +

2  
Pm
i=1 s
c
i
1A2 Hc

3  

+ 
Ho

1  

+ 
: (2.22)
Proof: Let W c be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium that reads
W c =
nX
i=1
(i   ci)xci  

2
nX
i=1
xc2i  

2
nX
i=1
xci
X
j 6=i
xcj : (2.23)
Let us analyze (2.23) term by term.
nX
i=1
(i   ci)xci = Hc (2   )xc2 + xc2:

2
nX
i=1
xc2i =

2
Hcxc2:

2
nX
i=1
xci
X
j 6=i
xcj =

2
nX
i=1
xci (x
c   xci ) =

2
 
xc2  
nX
i=1
xc2i
!
=

2
 
xc2  Hcxc2 :
Therefore,
W c = Hc (2   )xc2 + xc2   
2
Hcxc2   
2
 
xc2  Hcxc2 = 3   
2
Hcxc2 +

2
xc2:
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Using the denition of Ho; social welfare in the optimum is
W o =
   
2
Hoxo2 +

2
xo2:
Plugging the values of W c and W o in PWLc we obtain
PWLc = 1  W
c
W o
= 1 

xc
xo
2 Hc (3   ) + 
Ho (   ) +  ;
and plugging in the values of xc and xo we obtain (2.22).
Note that PWLc here depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation  , the number
of active rms in the optimum m, the sum of the market shares of the m largest rmsPm
i=1 s
c
i and the Hirschman-Herndahl indices of concentration evaluated at the Cournot
equilibrium and in the optimum, Hc and Ho. When m = 1, we have that
PWLc(m = 1) = 1 
Hc

3  

+ 

 +

2  

sc1
2 ;
which is decreasing in Hc. In the polar case wherem = ni.e. the number of active rms
is the same in the optimum and in a Cournot equilibriumafter lengthy calculations we
arrive to the following:
PWLc(m = n) =
Hc

1 + (n  1) 

  
Hc

2  
2 
1 + (n  1) 

+



2 
n  2  (n  1) 
 : (2.24)
If all rms are identical, Hc = 1n and PWL
c(m = n) = 1
2+(n 1) 

2 , that is what we
found in Lemma 1. Notice that Hc and  are less than one, so for reasonable values
of n it makes sense to evaluate (2.24) as if n were a large number. In this case (2.24)
simplies to
PWLc(m = n; n large) =
Hc
Hc

2  
2
+ 

1  
 :
Computing
@PWLc(m = n; n large)
@ 
=  
Hc

1  2    2Hc(2   )


Hc

2  
2
+ 

1  
2
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which is negative for  2 (0; 1 4H
c
2(1 Hc)) and positive for

 2 ( 1 4H
c
2(1 Hc) ; 1). So the minimum
of PWLc(m = n; n large) occurs at  =
1 4Hc
2(1 Hc) : When H
c = 0:18, which the FTC
considers the threshold for a concentrated industry, the minimal PWLc is 0.241967
which is a large lower bound.
Now we consider welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In a Bertrand equilibrium with heterogeneous rms
PWLb = 1 
0@

1 +  (n  2)

1 +  (m  1)

m 

1 +  (n  2)

+

1  

2 +  (2n  3)
Pm
i=1 s
b
i
1A2  (2.25)
Hb

1  

3 +  (3n  4)

+ 

1 +  (n  2)


Ho

1  

+ 

1 +  (n  2)
 :
Proof: Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium, denoted by W b reads,
W b =
(   ) (3 +  (3n  4))
2 ( +  (n  2)) H
bxb2 +

2
xb2:
Let PWLb be the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
PWLb = 1  W
b
W o
= 1 

xb
xo
2
Hb (   ) (3 +  (3n  4)) +  ( +  (n  2))
(Ho (   ) + ) ( +  (n  2)) :
So, plugging in the values of xb and xo; we obtain the formula above.
Thus, PWLb depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation  , the number of
active rms in the optimum m and in a Bertrand equilibrium n, the sum of the market
shares ofm largest rms
Pm
i=1 s
b
i and the Hirschman-Herndahl indices of concentration
Hb and Ho evaluated, respectively, in a Bertrand equilibrium and in the optimum.
As before let us consider two special cases. First, when in the optimum only rm 1
is used by the planner. Then, m = 1 and
PWLb(m = 1) = 1 
0@ 1 +  (n  2)



1 +  (n  2)

+

1  

2 +  (2n  3)

sb1
1A2 
Hb

1  

3 +  (3n  4)

+ 

1 +  (n  2)

1 +  (n  2)
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that for  '  becomes PWLb(m = 1) = 0; that is what one expects for a Bertrand
equilibrium in the case of product homogeneity. Notice that PWLb(m = 1) is decreasing
in Hb.
Second, when the number of active rms is the same in the optimum and in a
Bertrand equilibrium, after lengthy calculations, we obtain that
PWLb(m = n) =

Hb

1 +  (n  1)

  

1  

1 +  (n  1)

Hb

1  

2 +  (2n  3)
2
+



2 
n  2 +  (3 + (n  3)n)
 :
(2.26)
If all rms are identical, Hb = 1n and PWL
b(m = n) =

1  

2+ 

(n 3)
2
as in Lemma 2.
Finally, when n is large, (2.26) simplies to
PWLb(m = n, n large) =
Hb(1   )

 + 4H
b

1  
 ;
which is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation  . Its maximal value is 0.25
(for  = 0). For H
b = 0:18, PWLb(m = n, n large) =
0:18 0:18 

0:28 

+0:72
which for values of 
larger than 0.75 is less than 4:8%: So in this case a high concentration does not imply
large welfare losses.
From (2.24) and (2.26) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7. If goods are substitutes (resp. complements), PWLj(m = n) is in-
creasing (resp. decreasing) in Hj , j = c; b.
Proof: Computing @PWL
c
@Hc (m = n),



1  

1 +  (n  1)

4 +  (n  2)


4Hc

1 +  (n  2)

+



3
(Hc   1) (n  1) +



2
(n  2 +Hc (5  4n))
2 ;
that is positive if  > 0 and negative if

 < 0. Also,
@PWLb
@Hb
(m = n) is equal to
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
1  

1 +  (n  1)

1 +  (n  2)

4 + 5  (n  2) +



2
(6 + (n  6)n)


4Hb

1 + 2  (n  2)

+



3 
3 Hb (3  2n)2 + (n  3)n

+



2
(n  2 +Hb (21 + 4 (n  5)n))
2 ;
that is positive if  > 0 and negative if

 < 0.
Thus, form = n and goods are substitutes, PWL increases with H, contrary to what
happens when m = 1 in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. This is because the
condition m = n (resp. m = 1) is related to goods being poor (resp. good) substitutes.
However, when goods are complements and m = n PWL decreases with concentration
because, as we show in Subsection 2.1, competition does not work well when products
are complements. Finally, a word of caution: in Proposition 7 we have taken H as being
independent of all other variables a¤ecting PWL like  and n. But H depends on these
variables. So, strictly speaking, Proposition 7 only applies to variations in H that are
caused by variations in s and cs.
3. A Model of a Large Group
In this section we consider that the market for a di¤erentiated good is supplied by a
large number of rms. You may think of goods like restaurants, wine, beer, etc. We will
not consider entry and xed costs because as it was shown in Corchón (2008), entry and
xed costs might produce a very high PWL. In this paper we want to study the impact
of product di¤erentiation alone on PWL so we discard both xed costs and entry that
are likely to bias our estimates of PWL. As we will see this model is capable of yielding
a very high PWL. The model can be interpreted as a monopolistic competition model
in which the long-run aspects are not considered. In this framework, the relative size of
rms is not an important issue so we will assume that all rms are identical. Also, for
convenience, we will assume that rms compete in quantities.
The consumer surplus reads
U =
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 
nX
i=1
pixi; ; r 2 (0; 1),
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see Spence (1976). The inverse demand function of rm i is
pi = r
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 1
x 1i :
Denition 5. A CES Market is a list f; r; c; ng with ; r 2 (0; 1), c > 0, and n 2 N.
Prot function for rm i is i = r
 Pn
i=1 x

i
 r

 1
xi   cxi: Because there is a high
number of rms, each rm takes
Pn
i=1 x

i as given. The elasticity of demand, denoted
by , is dened as the inverse of the elasticity of inverse demand, namely
 =
1
1   : (3.1)
Thus when  ! 1 the elasticity of demand becomes innite. Now we have the following
preliminary result.
Lemma 5. In a CES market
PWLs = 1   11 r
1
   r
1  r : (3.2)
Proof: First order condition of prot maximization for rm i is:
r
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 1
x 1i   c = 0: (3.3)
Left-hand side of (3.3) is decreasing in xi so second order condition holds. In a symmetric
equilibrium where all rms produce the same output, denoted by xi , we have that:
xi =

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
, p =
c

and U = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
: (3.4)
In equilibrium, social welfare is
W  = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
  nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
:
In the optimal allocation price equals marginal cost and so,
r
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 1
x 1i = c:
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From this we get,
xoi =

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
and W o = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
  nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
; (3.5)
where xoi and W
o stand for output and social welfare in the optimum. W o is increasing
in n, so in the full optimum the planner would choose a number of rms equal to n.
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses is:
PWLs = 1  W

W o
= 1 
n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r   nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r   nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
=
= 1   11 r
1
   r
1  r :
At rst glance it is surprising that PWLs does not depend on the number of rms
n. However, we have assumed that the number of rms is great. Thus, (3.2) can be
understood as the limit formula when n is large. The following properties of PWLs are
easily proved:
Proposition 8. i) PWLs is decreasing in :
ii) lim!1 PWLs = 0 and lim!0 PWLs = 1:
iii) PWLs is increasing in r.
iv) limr!1 PWLs = 1 and limr!0 PWLs = 0.
The explanation of ii) is that when  is close to one (resp. zero), product is close
to being homogeneous (resp. very di¤erentiated), and welfare losses are small (resp.
large), see (3.1). The explanation of iii) is that when r increases (resp. decreases) the
gap between the optimal and the equilibrium output increases (resp. decreases) too, see
(3.4) and (3.5). It follows from ii) and iv) that it is possible to have a market where the
elasticity of demand is close to innity (i.e.  close to 1) and PWL is as close to 1 as we
wish.7 In brief, elasticity of demand is only a partial measure of PWL in this model.
7Even if  = r, lim!1 PWLs = 0:2642, a large number.
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Let us relate PWLs with observable variables as dened in Denition 4 in the
previous section. Notice that the rst order conditions of prot maximization imply that
 = pp c so in this framework, as in the Bertrand case in the previous section, knowledge
of the elasticity of demand is of no help. We will assume that c(ln n+ln p) < p ln n; that
will ensure that r < 1.
In our construction, the function ProductLog (t) will play a prominent role. This
function, called the Lamberts W-function, gives the solution for w in t = wew and has
the following properties:8
i) ProductLog (t) 2 R for t 2  1e ;1;
ii) ProductLog
  1e =  1;
iii) limt!1 ProductLog (t) =1;
iv) ProductLog (0) = 0.
v) ProductLog (t) is increasing in t 2  1e ;1.
vi) eaProductLog(t) (ProductLog (t))a = ta.
Now we have our main result in this section:
Proposition 9. Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng there is a CES market f; r; c; ng such
that (p; xi) is an equilibrium for this market, and
PWLs = 1 

c
p
 1
1 r p
c   r
1  r (3.6)
with r =
ProductLog
 
npxi
 
p
c ln n+ ln xi

p
c ln n+ ln xi
:
Proof : Let  and r be such that
r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
= xi
c

= p
8See Weisstein (1999).
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The previous equations yield
 =
c
p
r =
ProductLog
 
npxi
 
p
c ln n+ ln xi

p
c ln n+ ln xi
:
It is straightforward to check that 0 <  < 1 and 0 < r < 1 (using the condition
c
p <
ln n
ln n+ln p). Then by construction the CES market f; r; c; ng yields an equilibrium
where p = p and xi = xi. Plugging in  and r in (3.2) we get the formula for PWL
s
as a function of an observation fp; xi; c; ng.
An important consequence of Proposition 9 is that, given an observation, there is
a unique value of PWLs. The reason for that is that in this case, the number of
parameters to be "recovered" equals the number of data.
Next, we analyze the properties of PWLs in (3.6):
Proposition 10. The percentage of welfare losses in the CES model is such that:
i) limn!1 PWLs = 1 

c
p
 1
1  cp
 
p
c + 1

.
ii) lim c
p
!1 PWLs = 0.
iii) lim c
p
!1 (limn!1 PWLs) = 1  2e ' 0:2642.
Note that for a nite number of rms that are pricing at the marginal cost, PWLs is
close to zero. However, with an innite number of rms that are pricing at the marginal
cost, PWLs is quite high. In fact, it can be argued that the formula in i) above is
the one that should be used since we assumed that n was large. In this case, PWLs is
decreasing with the price-marginal cost margin, p cp , and looks like in Figure 3.1.
9
9When n is not large, we have an example, available upon request, showing that PWL is not
monotonic in the price-marginal cost margin.
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Figure 3.1: limn!1 PWL as a function of price-marginal cost margin p cp
4. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the relationship of observable variables with welfare losses,
taking the behavior of rms as given10. The models presented in this paper have been
selected by their impact in the profession.11 The main message of this paper is positive
in the sense that this is a feasible endeavor in the models considered in this paper.
We also have uncovered several facts that contradict our intuition about how rates of
returns, demand elasticities or price-marginal cost margins a¤ect welfare losses. We
remark that we are not against the use of price-marginal cost margins or elasticities
as indicators of welfare losses (such variables are widely used in issues like mergers,
detection of cartelized behavior, predation or abusive practices). Our point is that such
use must take into account the actual role played by these variables.
10See Sutton (1998) for an approach where the only source of variation across rms is the degree of
competitiveness.
11The papers by Dixit, Singh and Vives and Spence obtained, respectively, 341 citations, 422 citations
and 639 citations in Google Scholar.
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We end this paper by giving some hints on how data and elasticities may help
us to discriminate among these models. The clearest case is a Bertrand equilibrium.
A necessary condition of this equilibrium to be supported by the data is that for all i,
pi = "(pi ci) (irrespective of the market being linear or not). If the elasticity of demand
cannot be estimated, Proposition 2 says that any observation can be interpreted as a
Bertrand equilibrium. The case for the CES model relies on two assumptions. On the
one hand, the elasticity of demand must be constant. On the other hand, the cross
elasticity of demand (calculated as 1@pi
@xj
xj
pi
) should be very high (it amounts to nr  ).
Finally, a Cournot equilibrium has also implications. Let     @pi@xi
xi
pi
be the elasticity
of the inverse demand function. The elasticity  can be obtained by inverting the system
of demand functions. For instance, in the symmetric case with n = 2, it is easy to prove
that  = "
"2 2 . Thus, from FOC of prot maximization pi = pi   ci.
Appendix
A. Computing PWL from Observable Variables in the Case of Hetero-
geneous Firms
Let us relate PWLc and PWLb with observable variables. In this framework by anal-
ogy with the symmetric case, a linear market is a list f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng
such that i > ci,  > maxf0; ; (n   1)g and n 2 N. An observation is a list
fp1; :::; pn; x1; :::; xn; c1; :::; cn; ng.
First, we analyze the Cournot equilibrium. Assume further that the demand elastic-
ities, "1; :::; "n, are observable. Note that a necessary condition of this equilibrium to be
supported by the data is that for all i 6= j, pi cixi =
pj cj
xj
and "i
pi ci
pi
= "j
pj cj
pj
, where
we denote the latter by T  "i pi cipi . In the case of complements, there is one more
necessary condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be supported by the data, namely,P
j 6=i xj
xi
< 4T(n 1)q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2) (T 1)(n 2)
that will ensure that i > ci.
Proposition 11. Given an observation fp1; :::; pn; x1; :::; xn; c1; :::; cn; n; "1; :::; "ng such
that T  "i pi cipi  1 and the information that goods are substitutes or complements,
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there is a linear market f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng where
i = ci +
pi
2xi"i (n  1) 0@T (n  2) nX
i=1
xi + (3n  2) xi
!
  (n  2)
X
j 6=i
xj 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
X
j 6=i
xj
1A
 =
pi   ci
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2)
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
pi   ci
xi
with sigh "+" (resp. "-") corresponding to the case of substitutes (resp. complements),
such that (x1; :::; xn) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market, pi = i  xi  
P
j 6=i xj ;
i = 1; :::; n, and PWLc is given by (2.22), where sci =
xiPn
i=1 xi
, Hc =
Pn
i=1 (s
c
i )
2,
m is found with the algorithm to dene an optimal number of rms, and Ho =Pm
i=1

xoiPm
i=1 x
o
i
2
where xoi is given by (2.18).
Proof: In the case of substitutes let
i = ci +
pi
2xi"i (n  1) 0@T (n  2) nX
i=1
xi + (3n  2) xi
!
 
 
(n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!X
j 6=i
xj
1A
 =
pi   ci
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
pi   ci
xi
:
See the proof of Proposition 3 for the checkup of the conditions  > 0 and 0 <

 < 1. Let us show that i > ci that amounts to T ((n  2)
Pn
i=1 xi + (3n  2) xi)  
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
(n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
P
j 6=i xj > 0. Note that
T
 
(n  2)
nX
i=1
xi + (3n  2) xi
!
 
 
(n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!X
j 6=i
xj 
T
 
(n  2)
nX
i=1
xi + (3n  2) xi
!
+ (T  2) (n  2)
 
nX
i=1
xi   xi
!
=
2 (T  1) (n  2)
nX
i=1
xi + 2 (Tn+ (n  2)) xi
which is positive for T  1 and n  2. Therefore, i > ci. It is straightforward to show
that the linear market f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where
(xc1; :::; x
c
n) = (x1; :::; xn) and pi = i xi 
P
j 6=i xj ; i = 1; :::; n (the proof is analogous
to the one of Proposition 3). Now we nd PWLc by plugging the values of 1; :::; n; 
and  in (2.22).
Let us consider the case of complements. Let
i = ci +
pi
2xi"i (n  1) 0@T (n  2) nX
i=1
xi + (3n  2) xi
!
 
 
(n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!X
j 6=i
xj
1A
 =
pi   ci
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2) 
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
pi   ci
xi
:
See the proof of Proposition 3 for the checkup of the condition   1n 1 <  < 0. The
condition i > ci holds due to the condition
P
j 6=i xj
xi
< 4T(n 1)q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2) (T 1)(n 2)
. By
analogy with the symmetric case we can show that the linear market f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng
yields a Cournot equilibrium where (xc1; :::; x
c
n) = (x1; :::; xn) and pi = i xi 
P
j 6=i xj ;
i = 1; :::; n (see the proof of Proposition 3 for details). Then it is straightforward to nd
PWLc by plugging the values of 1; :::; n;  and  in (2.22).
31
Let us now consider the Bertrand equilibrium. By analogy with the symmetric case
the observation of demand elasticities does not allow us to dene PWLb as a function
of observables. We assume that the cross elasticities of demand, ij  @xi@pj
pj
xi
; i 6= j, are
observable. A necessary condition of the Bertrand equilibrium to be supported by the
data is that for all i 6= j and k 6= l, pi cixi =
pj cj
xj
and ij
pi ci
pj
= kl
pk ck
pl
.
Proposition 12. Given an observation

p1; :::; pn; x1; :::; xn; c1; :::; cn; n; 12; :::; n n 1
	
such that pjpi ci > max

ij (n  1) ; ij
	
, there is a linear market f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng
where
i = pi +
pj
Pn
i=1 xi
nxi

pj
pi ci   ij (n  1)
   pj (Pni=1 xi   nxi)
nxi

pj
pi ci + ij

 =
pj

pj
pi ci   ij (n  2)

xi

pj
pi ci + ij

pj
pi ci   ij (n  1)

 =
pjij
xi

pj
pi ci + ij

pj
pi ci   ij (n  1)
 ;
such that (p1; :::; pn) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market, xi = xbi (pi; p i), and
PWLb is given by (2.25), where sbi =
xiPn
i=1 xi
, Hb =
Pn
i=1
 
sbi
2
, m is found with the
algorithm to dene an optimal number of rms, and Ho =
Pm
i=1

xoiPm
i=1 x
o
i
2
where xoi
is given by (2.18).
Proof : It is straightforward to show that  and  in the proposition satisfy  >
maxf0; ; (n 1)g for pjpi ci > max

ij (n  1) ; ij
	
. Condition i > ci amounts to
pi   ci + pj
ij
Pn
i=1 xi + xi

pj
pi ci   ij (n  1)

xi

pj
pi ci + ij

pj
pi ci   ij (n  1)

that is positive for pjpi ci > max

ij (n  1) ; ij
	
. By analogy with the symmetric
case we can show that the linear market f1; :::; n; ; ; c1; :::; cn; ng yields a Bertrand
equilibrium where pbi = p and x
b
i (pi; p i) = xi (see the proof of Proposition 5 for details).
Then it is straightforward to nd PWLb by plugging the values of 1; :::; n;  and 
in (2.25).
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